Chemical and radiological vulnerability assessment in urban areas by Stojanović, Božidar & Jovašević-Stojanović, Milena
UDC 502.15:711.433 (497.11) 
s p a t i u m   21 
 
 
CHEMICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT IN URBAN AREAS 
 
Božidar Stojanović, Milena Jovašević-Stojanović 
 
 
Cities and towns are faced with various types of threat from the extraordinary events involving chemical and radiological 
materials as exemplified by major chemical accidents, radiological incidents, fires, explosions, traffic accidents, terrorist 
attacks, etc.  On the other hand, many sensitive or vulnerable assets exist within cities, such as: settlements, infrastructures, 
hospitals, schools, churches, businesses, government, and others. Besides emergency planning, the land use planning also 
represents an important tool for prevention or reduction of damages on people and other assets due to unwanted events. This 
paper considers development of method for inclusion vulnerability assessment in land use planning with objective to assess 
and limit the consequences in cities of likely accidents involving hazardous materials. We made preliminary assessment of 
criticality and vulnerability of the assets within Belgrade city area in respect to chemical sites and transportation roads that 
can be exposed to chemical accidents, or terrorist attacks.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Over 60% of European population lives in 
cities, because they are a driving force of the 
economic development. On the other hand the 
cities are faced with many kinds of threats, 
such as: risk of the chemical accidents, 
radiological incidents, fires, explosions, traffic 
accidents, terrorist attacks and others. Such 
threats within cities, find a target-rich 
environment due to a complex interacting 
system of people, buildings, infrastructures 
(utilities, roads, railroads, ports, airports), 
hospitals, schools, churches, businesses, 
government, and military facilities, which all 
together, define a city’s way of life. Many of 
those assets are incompatible with their 
surroundings involving hazardous establish-
ments. Accidents as these of Bhopal and 
Mexico City, and more recently of Enschede 
and Tolouse, have clearly demonstrated how 
the consequences of industrial accidents may 
be severely amplified by the adjacency of 
hazardous installations and high-density 
population areas [1]. More over the experience 
of the war conflicts in the past decade has 
shown that attacks on chemical facilities 
produced severe impacts to environment and 
people [2]. After the tragic events of 11th 
September 2001, terrorist and criminal acts are 
now considered credible incidents in the 
process industries and threat to their surroun-
ding. To-date, the response of both, govern-
ments and industry has been to focus on 
improved physical and cyber security to pre-
vent accidents as well as attacks and the asso-
ciated consequences [3]. While prevention is 
clearly preferred, the potential for accident and 
successful attacks and vulnerability of facilities 
and cities must be recognized and addressed. 
However, methods for vulnerability assessment 
in respect to accidental or intentional hazar-
dous events, particularly terrorist attacks invol-
ving chemical and radiological (CR) materials 
and various weapons, have not been sufficien-
tly developed. Some methods and guides have 
been developed for some important assets, as 
exemplified by: chemical facilities [4], 
buildings and public areas [5], transportation 
infrastructure [6], and some others. Although 
these methods include some spatial aspects, 
they do not enable inclusion of the results on 
vulnerability assessment in land use planning. 
This paper presents preliminary results of 
developing a generic methodological frame-
work for analysis of vulnerabilities of specific 
assets in pair with the chemical and 
radiological threats. Main steps in this 
framework include identification of critical 
assets and vulnerable zones in urban area, and 
implementation of results in the formulation of 
mitigation strategies, specifically in the 
process of land use planning, site selection 
and spatial arrangement of critical and 
sensitive assets. Results of a preliminary study 
of the vulnerability of assets in the vicinity of 
dangerous establishments within Belgrade city 
area are presented. 
DEFINITIONS 
In practice, the terms in risk management 
context are commonly used in various ways. 
Therefore, it is useful to define how these terms 
are used and how they relate to each other. 
These definitions were derived from material 
used by the US National Infrastructure 
Protection Center [7], taking into account some 
specific characteristics of chemical and 
radiological risk management. 
Risk is the potential for some unwanted event 
to occur. Risk is a function of the likelihood of 
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the event occurring and its consequences. The 
likelihood of the event occurring depends upon 
threat and vulnerability.  
Threat is the capability of an accident on 
chemical or radiological site, or intention of an 
adversary to undertake actions that are 
hazardous to an organization or community’s 
interests. Threat can be intristic, related to 
factors internal to the system (failure, 
sabotage), and extrintic related to factors 
external to system (terrorism and others). 
Extrinsic threat is a function of the adversary 
only and the owner or user of the asset cannot 
typically control it. However, the adversary’s 
intention to exploit his capability may be 
encouraged by vulnerability in an asset or 
discouraged by its resilience.  
Vulnerability is best understood as any 
weakness in an asset or community that can 
provoke accident or can be exploited by an 
adversary to cause damage to an organization’s 
or community’s interests. More precisely, 
vulnerability is defined as an estimate of the 
inability of an asset to tolerate impacts over 
time and space. A vulnerability assessment 
addresses the susceptibility to attack and the 
broad range of physical-chemical-radiological 
threats to the security and safety of assets.  It 
provides a basis for an estimation of the 
probability of realization of adversary threat. 
Asset is anything of value (people, natural and 
built environment, facilities, economic and 
societal activities). Assets are what a 
community or organization needs to carry out 
the mission. The more critical the asset is to a 
community accomplishing its mission, the 
greater the effect of its damage or destruction. 
Consequences are effects if the threat is 
carried out against the assets. Consequences 
of a chemical and radiological event may 
include deaths, illness; contamination of 
people, environment and property; economic 
losses, and psychological impact.    
Countermeasures (mitigation measures) are 
actions or devices that mitigate risk by 
affecting an asset, threat, or vulnerability. 
ROLE OF LAND USE PLANNING 
(LUP) IN RISK MANAGEMENT 
Land use planning (LUP) represents a 
framework for spatial arrangement of urban 
structures and functions, as exemplified by 
housing, job locations, infrastructure, 
recreation, water, nature and agriculture, etc. 
Accident and threat control and assets 
protection objectives have to be balanced with 
other planning objectives, such as the efficient 
use of land and resources, and must take into 
account existing physical, programmatic, and 
fiscal constraints. 
The need of land-use regulations around 
hazardous installations was one of the factors 
leading to the revision of Directive 82/501/EEC 
(the Seveso Directive) [8]. In the resulting 
Directive 96/82/EC (Seveso II Directive) [9], 
the European Commission has considered the 
introduction of land use planning requirements 
in the vicinity of sites falling under the 
obligations of the Directive as a necessary 
measure for the mitigation of consequences of 
accidents [10]. The recent amendment of the 
Seveso II Directive, has furthermore stressed 
the need to develop common guidelines, 
calling for the development of a common 
database, to be used in order to assess the 
compatibility between the establishments and 
their surroundings [11]. 
Directive through controls on the siting of new 
establishments, modifications to existing 
establishments and new developments such as 
transport links, locations frequented by the 
public and residential areas in the vicinity of 
existing establishments. In the long term, land-
use planning strategies shall ensure that 
appropriate distances between hazardous 
establishments and residential areas, areas of 
public use and areas of particular natural 
sensitivity or interest are maintained, so as not 
to increase the risks to people, as shown in the 
Fig. 1 [12].  
The problem of incompatible land-use 
planning around hazardous installations seems 
to exists due to improper implementation of a 
plan, and interchanging of plan implementation 
with planning. Such a conclusion stems from a 
number of suggestions, proposals, models on 
how to solve existing or potential conflicting 
situations as illustrated in Fig. 2. 
These cases consider the problem of precise 
land-use planning related to hazardous 
installations after zoning is already established, 
i.e., after the general land-use plan is already 
approved.  
Important areas excluded from the scope of the 
Seveso II Directive include nuclear safety, the 
transport of dangerous substances and intere-
iate temporary storage outside establishments 
and the transport of dangerous substances by 
pipelines.  
Fig. 1 – Role of land use planning in risk management 
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Fig. 2 - Illustration of a 
common conflicting 
situation, which occurs 
due to isolated 
licensing processes:  
(a) conflicting situation 
and  
b) non conflicting 
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However, as accidents from various sources 
and terrorists and other attacks against assets 
do continue to occur, it is necessary to limit 
the consequences of such accidents not only 
for people (safety and health aspects) but also 
for the environment (environmental aspect). In 
that respect, the land use planning should 
include all risks in planning area taking into 
account vulnerability of valuable assets. 
METHODOLOGY 
The vulnerability assessment integration in 
urban planning process typically occurs in two 
major phases: (I) risk assessment, and (II) 
planning, as shown in the  Figure 3 .  
Main steps of the methodology are:  
1. Vulnerability screening determines if further 
risk management is needed. In this step 
assessor identifies critical asserts and assess 
the threat in urban area. Identification of critical 
assets begins with identification of the LUP 
issues (existing and planned land use pattern, 
hazardous zones, sensitive zones, buffer zones, 
infrastructures, etc.), then proceed with 
creation of an all-inclusive list of critical assets 
(sites involving CR materials, government 
establishments, transportation infrastructure 
and facilities, public places, commercial and 
financial buildings, cultural and religious 
buildings, and others). Key indicators for 
estimation of an asset criticality are: symbolic 
importance, functional importance, economic 
value, people count, effectivity of safety 
management system, time to recover and 
accesibility. Threat assessment defines the 
degree of the threats against an asset by 
evaluating the intent, motivation, tools, wea-
pons and possible tactics of those who may 
carry them out. The process involves collecting 
historical data about hostile events and 
evaluating terorrist group existence, their intent 
and capability to use CR agents against critical 
asset. Preliminary vulnerability assessment 
would be carried out by use of multicriteria 
analysis (MCA) matrix of pair identified assets 
Fig. 3 - Methodology for integration of vulnerability assessment in land use planning 
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and threats. Criteria for the asset criticality 
estimation are based on the criticality criteria 
of each indicator, ranking them from 
“extremely important” (5) to “less important“ 
(1). Determination of the threat level include 
relative ranking of threats against each asset on 
the list, using numerical scale and ranking 
them from “critical threat” (5) to “negligible 
threat“ (1). After calculating the scores and 
ranking the critical assets, a screening 
thresholds would be applied. The selected 
items form the prioritized critical asset list 
which should be integrated in the composite 
city map showing specific geometries that 
include vulnerable assets as zones, lines and 
points. The assets having highest priorities 
would be further assessed to determine 
detailed threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, 
risks and countermeasures.   
2. Consequence assessment analyses the na-
ture and severity of the adverse effects asso-
ciated with identified causal factors. This pro-
cess begins with creation of scenarios that pair 
identified assets and threats, followed by expo-
sure assessment and estimation of effects on 
the assets, in particular on people and environ-
ment. Consequence assessment includes two 
estimates: level of possible accident, e.g. geo-
graphic scale, and type and intensity of effects. 
3. Risk assessment uses qualitative or quanti-
tative analysis to integrate the results of conse-
quence assessments with the estimation of 
vulnerability e.g. probability that these conse-
quences can occur. 
4. Countermeasure strategies, that include: 
terrorrist attack deterrioration and prevention, 
improvement of physical security, reducing 
threat and vulnerability, limiting consequences 
and remediation of consequences. The most 
important task for spatial planning is exlusion 
of further settlement in vulnerable and risky 
zones. 
5. Planning assumes preparing of two main 
types of plans: land use planning and emer-
gency planning. Inclusion of  a range of 
security and safety measures into compre-
hensive and local land use planning can 
contribute to reducing vulnerability and limiting 
consequences of an extraordinary event occu-
ring. Planning elements are: spatial arran-
gement of spaces and activities, site selection 
for particular uses, area development planning 
including buffer zones in vicinity of hazardous 
establishments and installations, relocation of 
hazardous or vulnerable assets, building and 
structure protective requirements, security 
measures in infrastructures planning, identi-
fication of evacuation routes, determination of 
implementation rules, etc.  
6. Implementation of plan includes conducting 
planned activities by reponsible authorities and 
developers according to prescribed rules, 
phasing and costs. 
 Criticality indicator Criticality criteria Factor value 
International 5 
National 4 
Regional 3 
Municipal 2 
 
 
1 
 
 
Functional importance 
Local 1 
More than 100 mil. USD 5 
50 – 100 mil. USD 4 
10 – 50 mil. USD 3 
2 – 10 mil. USD 2 
 
 
2 
 
 
Economic value* 
Less than 2 mil. USD 1 
More than 1,500 5 
1, 500 – 120 4 
120 – 61 3 
60 – 11 2 
 
 
3 
 
 
People count  
in hazardous zone*  
10 – 0 1 
Underground water-supply
protected zones 
5 
Protected natural assets 4 
Valuable agricultural zones – fertile 
land 
3 
Surface waters 2 
 
 
4 
 
 
Ecological sensitivity 
Unfertile land 1 
Extremely toxic/radioactive 5 
Highly toxic/radioactive 4 
Toxic/radioactive 3 
Highly flammable/explosive 2 
 
 
5 
 
 
Type of chemical - radioactive 
material 
Flammable/explosive 1 
More than upper threshold value 
(UTV) 
5 
Between UTVand lower threshold 
value (LTV) 
4 
100-50 % LTV 3 
50 – 10 % LTV 2 
 
 
6 
 
 
Quantity of chemical - radioactive 
material 
Less than 10% of LTV 1 
Less than 0.1 5 
0.1 – 0.25 4 
0.25 – 0.50 3 
0.50 – 0.75 2 
 
 
7 
 
Ratio 
(separation distance/ required safety 
distance) 
0.75 – 1.00 1 
Low 5 
Poor 4 
Moderate 3 
Good 2 
 
 
8 
 
 
Safety system affectivity 
High 1 
* Adopted from: Risk Management Guidance for Health, Safety, and Environmental Security under  
Extraordinary Incidents, American SHRAE, Atalanta, Georgia, 2003
Table 1. – Vulnerability screening (assets criticality analysis) criteria
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7. Monitoring includes an evidence of the land 
use plan implementation and extraordinary 
events occuring in the space of plan. 
8. Reviewing assumes evaluation of implemen-
tation planning objectives and tasks and seting 
up the proposals for further reducing of vulne-
rabilities of the critical assets. 
RESULTS  
We carried out a preliminary study of the CR 
vulnerability of assets within Belgrade city area. 
At present, there are no recognised specific 
terrorist threats from use of chemical-radio-
logical materials and weapons. Taking into 
account that some chemicals and radioactive 
materials may be particularly attractive targets, 
as great potentials for greater consequences if 
released, we identified sites involving these 
materials in study with the aim to test proposed 
vulnerability assessment methodology. We 
carried out procedure of vulnerability screening 
as the first important step of procedure. A list 
of 46 sites and facilities involving hazardous 
materials prepared, and additionally main 
transportation routes of hazardous materials. 
On the basis of general vulnerability screening 
indicators we developed a specific assets 
criticality indicators and ranking criteria, as 
shown in the Table 1. 
Each establishment was estimated using these 
indicators and criteria. After calculating the 
scores and ranking the critical assets, a 
criticality categorization of the assets was 
applied, as follows: (1) high, having score 30-
40; (2) moderate (20-29); and (3) low (les 
than 20). We got a list of 14 highly critical 
establishments that belong to the first category. 
These establishments are shown in the Fig. 4 
together with corresponding hazardous zones, 
represented by cycles of 500 and 1,000 meters 
in radius [13]. We made, also, vulnerability 
screening of the main transportation routes of 
hazardous materials. Results of the highly 
critical rail and road routes are shown in the 
Fig. 5 [14] 
The results indicate that most of hazardous 
zones and transport routes are in conflict with 
densely populated areas (housing, businesses) 
and protected underground water sources. 
Responses to the present weakness of spatial 
arrangement of sensitive and hazardous assets 
were set up in the new Belgrade general plan. 
These include: planed options for sitting of new 
establishments, reconstruction and relocation 
of existing establishments, and new rules and 
conditions for the implementation of plan by 
application: quantitative risk assessment, safety 
barriers and zones, safety barriers and 
corridors on transportation routes, new safety 
criteria in a building design, monitoring and 
public participation.  
DISCUSION AND CONCLUSION 
Despite the great advance in theory and 
practice of urban planning, there are still many 
unsolved problems, particularly in respect to 
the assets security and safety in cities. Existing 
regulatory framework in the land use planning 
and building involves consideration of natural 
and man-made disasters, but do not take into 
account the threat from intentional attacks on 
valuable urban assets. 
In this study we proposed a methodology for 
inclusion of the vulnerability assessment 
procedure in the process of land use planning. 
By application of this methodology framework 
urban planning becomes more complex, and 
also requires huge volume of information. This 
is the reason for testing only the first step of 
 
Figure 5 – Road & rail routes for transportation of hazardous materials in Belgrade
Figure 4 – Hazardous sites and vulnerable zones in Belgrade 
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methodology, e.g. vulnerability screening of 
assets in the case of urban area of Belgrade 
city, based on available data about hazardous 
establishments, installations and transportation 
routes and spatial arrangement of the sensitive 
assets. The results of vulnerability screening 
show that despite qualitative approach it was 
possible to identify, estimate and categorize 
critical assets. This methodology enabled us to 
prioritise critical assets, for further 
investigation. However, by using the table of 
safety distances adopted from Christou&Porter 
[11], we defined hazardous zones for each of 
14 establishments on the list of highly critical 
assets. After spatial analysis of hazardous 
zones it was possible to propose mitigation 
measures that were applied in the General 
urban plan of Belgrade city.  
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